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Mo%va%on	   The	  Peer	  Truth	  Serum	  
Informa<on	  elicita<on	  mechanisms	  represent	  an	  important	  component	  
of	  many	  informa<on	  aggrega<on	  techniques:	  
•  Crowdsourcing	  
•  Community	  sensing	  
•  Product	  reviews	  
•  Opinion	  polls	  	  
We	   inves<gate	   how	   to	   incen<vize	   par<cipants	   to	   reveal	   their	   private	  




Compute	  reward	  by	  comparing	  with	  peer	  report	  xj.	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Uniqueness:	  if	  the	  self-­‐predic<ng	  condi<on	  is	  the	  only	  assump<on,	  any	  
Bayes-­‐Nash	  truthful	  scheme	  has	  the	  form	  of	  the	  peer	  truth	  serum.	  
Truthfulness:	  if	  agents’	  priors	  are	  close	  to	  R,	  and	  the	  self-­‐predic<ng	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Self-­‐predic%ng	  condi%on:	  Agents	  observa<on	  is	  a	  maximum-­‐likelihood	  
es<mate	  of	  the	  true	  distribu<on,	  also	  seen	  by	  its	  peers.	  
€ 
Pr(s j = xi | si)
Pr(s j = xi)
≥
Pr(s j = y | si)
Pr(s j = y)
Helpfulness:	  if	  agents’	  priors	  are	  far	  from	  R,	  but	  more	  informed	  (closer	  
to	  the	  true	  distribu<on	  of	  the	  signal),	  and	  the	  self-­‐predic<ng	  condi<on	  
holds,	  PTS	  supports	  equilibria	  in	  helpful	  strategies	  that	  make	  R	  converge	  
to	  the	  prior	  and	  are	  thus	  asympto'cally	  accurate.	  
Sensing:	  truthfulness	  is	  the	  
most	  proﬁtable	  strategy	  
even	  for	  a	  signiﬁcant	  
number	  of	  colluders	  
(simula<on	  using	  air	  quality	  
model	  on	  real	  data	  from	  the	  
city	  of	  Strassbourg).	  
Sensing:	  PTS	  encourages	  
measurements	  that	  bring	  
new	  informa<on	  beder	  than	  
peer	  predic<on	  with	  scoring	  
rules,	  thus	  making	  self-­‐
selec<on	  work	  beder	  (same	  
simula<on	  as	  above).	  
Predic%on	  poll:	  peer	  
predic<on	  using	  PTS	  
provides	  similar	  accuracy	  to	  
classical	  predic<on	  markets,	  
but	  require	  no	  ground	  truth	  
(data	  from	  the	  swissnoise.ch	  
plaeorm	  with	  about	  200	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